United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

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74-1550

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

NO. 74-1550

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-against-

CARMINE TRAMUNTI, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' JOINT APPENDIX
Vol. T(40) - Pages 5423 to 5503

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tpl 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 73 Cr. 1099 vs. 3 CARMINE TRAMUNTI, et al. New York, March 11, 1974. Trial resumed. 9 (At 10.00 o'clock A.M., the jury assembled in the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a 10 11 verdict.) 12 (At 10.40 o'clock P.M. in open court, in the 13 absence of the jury.) 14 THE CLERK: May I have your attention, please. Please answer to your attendance when your name 15 16 is called. 17 Herbert Siegal? MR. SIEGAL: Here. 18 THE CLERK: Gilbert Epstein? 19 20 MR. EPSTEIN: Here. THE CLERK: Nancy Rosner? 21 22 MRS. ROSNER: Here. 23 THE CLERK: Frank A. Lopez? MR. LOPEZ: Present. 24 25 THE CLERK: David Rosenbaum?

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2	MR. PHILLIPS: Will you have the roll call of				
3	the defendants, please?				
4	THE CLERK: Carmine Tramunti?				
5	DEFENDANT TRAMUNTI: Here.				
6	THE CLERK: Louis Inglese?				
7	DEFENDANT INGLESE: Here.				
8	THE CLERK: Joseph Di Napoli?				
9	DEFENDANT DI NAPOLI: Present.				
10	THE CLERK: Vincent D'Amico?				
11	DEFENDANT D'AMICO: Here.				
12	THE CLERK: William Alonzo?				
13	DEFENDANT ALONZO: Here.				
14	THE CLERK: Donato Christiano?				
15	DEFENDANT CHRISTIANO: Right here.				
16	THE CLERK: Angelo Mamone?				
17	DEFENDANT MAMONE: Here.				
18	THE CLERK: Frank Pugliese?				
19	DEFENDANT PUGLIESF: Here.				
20	THE CLERK: Joseph Ceriale?				
21	DEFENDANT CERIALE: Here.				
22	THE CLERK: Benjamin Tolopka?				
23	DEFENDANT TOLOPKA: Present.				
24	THE CLERK: Frank Russo?				
25	DEFENDANT RUSSO: Here.				

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THE CLERK: Warren C. Robinson?

DEFENDANT ROBINSON: Right here.

THE CLERK: Hattie Ware?

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DEFENDANT WARE: Here.

THE CLERK: John Springer?

DEFENDANT SPRINGER: Here.

THE CLERK: Henry Salley?

DEFENDANT SALLEY: Present.

THE CLERK: John Gamba?

DEFENDANT GAMBA: Right here.

(At 10.45 o'clock p.m. Mr. Richman noted his appearance on the record.)

THE CLERK: Who is covering for Gary Sunden?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Iwill cover for Mr. Sunden.

(At 10.50 P.M., in open court, in the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: I asked the clerk to call the roll of attorneys. At 10 or shortly thereafter I received a note and it was advised there were only five attorneys in the room at that time.

Those people who did not respond to the call of attorneys, unless they have a very good excuse, are going to be cited for contempt.

At the present time I understand we still have

1 tp5 2 some people missing. I believe Mr. Rosenberg is not here. 3 MR. LOPEZ: No, he is not here, your Honor, but I will cover for him if that helps. 4 5 THE COURT: Let us hear from Mr. Rosenberg's 6 client first. 7 DEFENDANT PUGLIESE: It's all right with me. 8 THE COURT: Is there anybody else missing? 9 Mr. Sunden? 10 MR. ROSENBAUM: I am covering for Mr. Sunden, 11 your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sunden's client? 13 DEFENDANT ALONZO: It's all right. 14 THE COURT: Is it all right with you, sir? 15 DEFENDANT ALONZO: Yes. 16 THE COURT: The note reads, "Judge Duffy: 17 "Will you please define for us the law with 18 regard to 'substantive counts' and the rules of 19 evidence regarding 'hearsay and circumstantial 20 evidence.' Will you kindly give this request 21 first priority." 22 Do you want me to reread it? 23 MR. WARNER: Yes, please. 24 THE COURT: "Judge Duffy: 25

"Will you please define for us the law with

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regard to 'substantive counts' and the rules of evidence regarding 'hearsat and circumstantial evidence.' Will you kindly give this request first priority."

Yes, Mr. Fisher?

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, I think hearsay is only admissible in this case on the conspiracy count.

I think the jury should be so advised that they may consider no hearsay with regard to the substantive counts.

I think those portions of your Honor's charge where you defined the elements necessary for conviction on the substantive count is sufficient to answer part one, and with regard to the circumstantial evidence, I think that is a clearly defined and articulable aspect of your charge which isn't too long.

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, with respect to circumstantial evidence, your Honor charged them and I think that the charge regarding circumstantial evidence can be read back to them.

With respect to hearsay evidence, I think that is a little more difficult problem, because I don't think your Honor went into the law on hearsay in yourcharge, which is, of course not unusual, and I think -- and I disagree with Mr. Fisher -- I first of all don't think your

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Honor should charge on hearsay except what is contained in your original charge to the jury and I disagree with Mr.

Fisher and that I think whatever hearsay evidence was admitted can be used on both the conspiracy and the substantive counts.

THE COURT: You rely upon United States v.

Pinkerton as the progeny for that, is that correct?

MR. FISHER: I didn't hear what you said.

THE COURT: Wait a second.

MR. PHILLIPS: We are not relying on United States v. Pinkerton, because I don't think your Honor charged under the Pinkerton theory, your Honor charged the aiding and abetting theory with respect to the substantive counts, but there was hearsay evidence that was admitted, there was much hearsay evidence that was admitted not subject to objection and was admitted on both conspiracy as well as the substantive counts.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Panzer, you wanted to be heard.

MR. PANZER: Your Honor, I think under the existing case law the jury would first have to find there was a conspiracy before they can consider hearsay even as to the conspiracy and as to the substantive counts.

There has been no indication as far as I can see that they

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have made any decision at all.

I agree with Mr. Phillips, your Honor did not charge the Pinkerton doctrine and I think we are limited. Hearsay would not apply to substantive counts if that were the case.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Curran?

MR.CURRAN: Your Honor, I think it is well established -- I can't cite you a case offhand, but I am sure I can find one in a couple of minutes -- it is well established it doesn't make any difference whether there is a conspiracy count in an indictment or not, if the charge in a substantive count involves a joint venture and the proof is showing someone is acting for someone else, so-called hearsay evidence is not really hearsay, it is an exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible to prove the substantive charges.

I submit, your Honor, even if there were no conspiracy charge in the indictment in connection with, for example, Count 21, about which the jury inquired yesterday, the evidence of Dilacio's statements with respect to the heroin involved in that count would be admissible against the co-defendant Di Napoli if there were a tie-in of Di Napoli to a narcotics transaction at this period of time.

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The fact of a conspiracy count in an indictment,

I don't think there is any magic in that. I think the

same proof where you are talking about aiding and abetting

and joint venture is admissible in substantive counts.

THE COURT: I am just wondering, the charge covered both direct and circumstantial evidence and they have quoted hearsay and circumstantial. I wonder if they are talking about direct and circumstantial. That is a possibility.

MRS. ROSNER: Your Honor, I would only add a few brief comments. I hope they are not repetitive.

The jury was not initially charged under the Pinkerton theory, although they might appropriately have been charged in the beginning.

In that posture, I think it would be impermissible for evidence admissible under the conspiracy count but not otherwise admissible under any of the substantive counts to be used by the jury in their deliberation on the substantive counts. I would suggest, your Honor, that the jury be instructed that in their consideration of the substantive counts, as to any named defendant, they are limited to the acts and statements of that defendant in determining whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that they are to disregard any hearsay by any other

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alleged co-conspirator in their determination of that count.

I think that is the simplest and most straightforward way, your Honor, of answering the problem.

MR. PHILLIPS: What Mrs. Rosner is asking your Honor to do is now to strike testimony that was introduced on various counts, and I don't think that is permissible to strike testimony as a response to a juror's request to hear the law or your Honor's charge with respect to certain elements of the law.

MR. LOPEZ: I think that the jury may be referring to Count 21, which is the Di Napoli count, which is based strictly on hearsay evidence.

I want to make sure that the record indicates that I join in Mr. Fisher's and Mrs. Rosner's position in that connection.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Panzer?

MR. PANZER: Your Honor, on Mr. Curran's argument, hearsay might be admissible if you establish there is an agency theory, but the only way you can establish that there was an agency theory on the substantive count would be by the acts of the particular principal, therefore, hearsay in and of itself could not establish the essential elements as to that substantive count and I don't think there is anything in the record with respect to Count 21 other than

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2 hearsay.

THE COURT: All right. I will tell you what I am going to do:

Mr. Curran said he could get me a couple of cases in a short time. I would assume that you gentlemen know where the Court of Appeals Library is. I will give you half an hour. If anybody is going to come up with some law, come up with it in a half-hour. All right?

(Recess.)

(At 11.40 a.m., in open court, in the absence of the jury.)

MR. LOPEZ: Judge Duffy, may I make a request?

In view of the fact that we are considering this last note from the jurywhich present intricate legal problems, I suggest it would be in order that we send the note back to the jury indicating to them to specify what count they are considering at this time so that at least we know their thoughts on the matter.

THE COURT: No, I don't think we ought to do that right now. Let us do it this way.

Of course, it would be of interest to a particular defendant which count is being considered, but I don't think we ought to get into it right now.

I suggest, as I indicated in the robing room,

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we will read the direct and circumstantial evidence by the Judge and the requirements of the substantive counts, and we will ask them if there is something specific that they want, please tell me about it and we will go on from there.

I am telling you, I am sure you recognize getting up a charge on hearsay at this point is going to be no simple task and one I am not going to attempt to toss off the top of my head.

MR. LOPEZ: I agree with your Honor. But I want the record to note in view of the fact that the jury is specifically mentioning the legal term "hearsay" and apparently yesterday they heard testimony on Count 21, which is a fully hearsay count or hearsay evidence under that count, I feel it would be appropriate at this time that we give consideration to this matter and that we do give them a charge on hearsay as it applies to the substantive Count 21. That is my request, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MRS. ROSNER: Your Honor, I think the jury must be told that they are being instructed from your Honor's original charge of the subject matter of the elements of the offense and the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence and I think they must be told the charge is not being read in response to the hearsay, because

1 tpl3 they might think what is being read covers what is entirely 2 in the note and they may be misled. 3 THE COURT: I said that is what I am going to 5 do. 6 MR. PANZER: Your Honor, I just want to put 7 on the record I will be absent. I have a medical appoint-8 ment. I conferred with my client. She agrees. 9 Leighton will cover for me. 10 MR. LEIGHTON: I will, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Will your client stand up, Mr. 12 Panzer? 13 Mrs. Ware, you have heard the statement of your 14 attorney. Do you consent to having Mr. Leighton cover for 15 Mr. Panzer? 16 DEFENDANT WARE: Yes. 17 MR. PANZER: Thank you. 18 (Jury present.) 19 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 20 THE FORELADY: Good morning. 21 THE COURT: I received a note from you earlier 22 this morning. The note reads: 23 24

"'hearsay and circumstantial evidence.' Will you kindly this request first priority."

Needless to say, I have.

I believe that what you meant when you said hearsay and circumstantial evidence was direct and circumstantial evidence, which is part of the charge.

I am going to have that read. I am also going to have read the law regarding the substantive counts.

If you specifically want a charge in connection with hearsay after you hear this, I want you to go back in, write me a note saying that you specifically want it. All right?

Okay, Mr. Court Reporter, would you be good enough to read the part first on direct and circumstantial evidence and then go on to the requirements as to the substantive counts.

(Page 5163, line 23, to page 5165, line 15; page 5196, line 14, to page 5199, line 12, read to the jury.)

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, excuse me, may we approach the side bar?

(At the side bar.)

THE COURT: I assume you want to stop reading the other counts?

MRS. ROSNER: Absolutely. Just indicate.

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THE COURT: All right.

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MR. CURRAN: No objection.

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MRS. ROSNER: In addition, your Honor, in the circumstantial evidence charge, the reporter didn't read the part about if an inference is favorable to the defendant it must be drawn. That was part of your Honor's

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circumstantial evidence charge.

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MR. CURRAN: It was covered.

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MR. PHILLIPS: I don't think it was.

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THE COURT: I think I have covered it.

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MR. LOPEZ: They omitted that, your Honor.

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MRS. ROSNER: They omitted the part if there were two inferences and one is favorable to the defendant, you

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must draw the --

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MR. CURRAN: You gave a definition of both and that is what you asked for.

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MR. LOPEZ: You are leaving --

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THE COURT: All right.

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(In open court.)

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THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, since you have the indictment inside, we are going to stop reading the

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counts of the indictment and shorten it.

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THE FORELADY: Thank you.

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(Page 5203, line 24, to page 5209, line 24, and page 5212, line 17, to page 5218, line 11, read to the jury.)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, as I said at the outset, if you want something else, just be good enough to send me a note about it.

Marshal, will you take the jury out.

THE FORELADY: Thank you.

(At 12.10 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

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MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, with respect to the portion of the charge now recently read, I wish to take an exception on behalf of all the defendants on the Court's failure to charge what was specifically requested by the jury, and that is the definition of hearsay as it applied to the substantive counts and, secondly, your Honor, on behalf of all defendants, I respectfully except to that portion of the charge involving circumstantial evidence and the failure of the Court to give the full charge on circumstantial evidence that it originally gave in its original instruction to the jury, and that is the matter of inferences.

MR. DOWD: Your Honor, I think that you instructed the jury with respect to direct and circumstantial evidence and if there are two inferences that they may draw, then they must draw an inference consistent with innocence, and that throughout what was said, you said, "You may infer, you may infer," which, without that cautionary instruction,

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which was part of the charge, leads the jury necessarily, based on the limited amount that they did hear, to draw the inevitable conclusion to immediately go to the inference that they may infer. It hasn't informed them that they may draw two inferences, they may draw the inference consistent with innocence.

I think that is a necessary and it is an integral element of the charge.

THE COURT: I assume everybody else joins in the motions, correct, or exceptions? All right. They are denied.

I am going out now to find out what arrangements have been made by the marshal for lunch. I will come back and I will tell you where you can't eat. We will go on from there.

I don't even know if he made arrangements yet, but I am going to get him to do it and let you know what the story is.

(At 12.25 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

THE COURT: As you know, I was going to send the jury to lunch at 12.30 and I asked everybody to remain until 12.30. I gather those who did not are voluntarily absent.

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I received another note just before the jury went to lunch.

"Jud

please.

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"Judge Duffy:

"Please explain your charge to us regarding 'hearsay evidence,' only hearsay evidence."

It is signed Lucy Hare, the Forelady.

Mr. Clerk, will you mark this as a Court's exhibit,

(Court's Exhibit 92 marked for

identification.)

THE COURT: I permitted you folks to do some research before this morning. Let us have the benefit of it.

Mr. Curran?

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, what I think I understand the jury to be referring to if it is an act or a statement made by a co-defendant in connection with either a substantive count or the conspiracy count of the presence of the person about whom the o-defendant is speaking or the co-conspirator is speaking, and it is the government's position, your Honor, that the decision as to the admissibility and, indeed, the competency of the evidence is one to be made by the Court in the first instance and that the jury should consider in determining guilt or innocence on the substantive

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counts and on the conspiracy count all the evidence that has been received by his Honor and all the evidence that has been put before them.

I think you did touch upon that in your charge.

We submit in the case United States v. Pugliese, to start off with, at 153 Fed. 2d at page 407, at page 500, that it makes no difference with respect if there is a joint venture being proved whether there is a conspiracy count in the indictment or not.

That doctrine was reiterated as recently as, I guess, 1973 in the case United States v. Alsondo, 486 Fed. 2d at page 1346, 1347.

The other two cases I mentioned to your Honor which I think deal with this point talk about, of course, the Court's charge and the kind of evidence a jury may consider in deciding upon guilt or innocence, and I cite to your Honor United States v. Ragland, 375 Fed. 2d 471. We can hand up a Xerox copy, your Honor, if you wish. We have a Xerox copy of the case.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CURRAN: And United States v. Nuccio, 373 Fed. 2d 168.

I think the point, going to Ragland first, your Honor, is that the Court makes the determination as to what

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evidence is admissible, so-called hearsay or any other kind of evidence, and once that decision is made by the Court the jury is not given any instruction distinguishing between hearsay, so-called hearsay or non-hearsay evidence. That is a matter for the Court in the same manner, really, your Honor, as the Court determines whether a particular defendant has been connected to the conspiracy by a fair preponderance of the evidence as set forth in Geaney, and that the jury is not to get involved in deciding whether evidence is hearsay or non-hearsay in determining guilt or innocence either with respect to a conspiracy count or with respect to a substantive count.

In Ragland, your Honor, at the very end of the opinion, at page 479, 375 Fed. 2d at 479, if I could just read here into the record, I would like to.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CURRAN: It is paragraph 24. The Court in 1967 in this circuit, "In deciding whether to almit hearsay statements made by conspirators against their co-conspirators, we think that the better doctrine is that the Judge is always to decide, as concededly he generally must, any issues of fact on which the competence of evidence depends and that if he decides it to be competent, he is to leave it to the jury to use like any other evidence without

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instructing them to consider it as proof only after they, too, have decided a preliminary issue which alone makes it competent."

That is citing Dennis there, your Honor.

The Court went on to say:

"The reason for the rule there stated," from Dennis, citing Dennis, "it is difficult to see what value the declarations could have as proof of the conspiracy if before using them the jury had to be satisfied that the declarant and the accused were engaged in the conspiracy charged, for upon that hypothesis the declarations would merely serve to confirm what the jury had already decided."

Then it went on to say, skipping paragraph 25, or part of it, your Honor, "Under the rule announced in United States v. Dennis Supra, the learned trial judge after thus determining the admissibility of the statements by the challenged instruction, unnecessarily gave the jury to secondguess his decision."

I think, your Honor, in United States v. Nuccio, we have somewhat similar language. Briefly, the Court said at page 173, 373 Fed. 2d 168 at 173:

"The established rule in this circuit is that determination of the adequacy of such proof is for

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the Judge and if he is satisfied on that score he is
to leave the declaration to the jury to use like any
other evidence without instructing them to consider
it as proof only after they, too, have decided a
preliminary issue which alone makes it competent,"
citing, your Honor, Dennis and Pugliese, which I
previously cited, and United States v. Stadter and also
United States v. Borrelli.

In addition, your Honor, over and above that point where we feel very strongly that questions of definition or decisions as to hearsay should not be given to the jury because it is not within their province as the Second Circuit has made plain, with respect to evidence at least on some of the substantive counts, and specifically we were talking this morning about Count 21 because there was —

THE COURT: I don't know what count we are talking about at this point.

MR. CURRAN: In a number of situations, your Honor, over and above the point we just made as a matter of law, there was no objection to receipt of declarations of co-conspirators and co-venturers, with respect to Count 21 specifically, your Honor, and on Pannirello's testimony there was no objection.

I think our main point is as a matter of law,

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your Honor.

MR. SUNDEN: Objection.

THE COURT: Wait a second.

Mr. Siegal, do you have anything to say in connection with this?

MR. SIEGAL: Only that there was an objection to all this hearsay testimony. As a matter of fact, I move to strike out at the end of the case all of the testimony taken subject to connection.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lopez --

MR. LOPEZ: Go to Mr. Fisher.

MRS. ROSNER: Taking Mr. Curran's arguments in inverse order, his statement is classic sandbagging. In order to avoid repeated objections, the Court granted to every defense counsel a standing objection to hearsay which was admitted subject to connection on the conspiracy count, including Pannirello and every other witness. So the argument that the record is not protected is simply without merit.

Your Honor, with respect to the substance of Mr. Curran's argument, I would analyse the jury's request and make an appropriate answer in the following fashion:

Mr. Curran correctly states that under a substantive count hearsay may be admissible when

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and only when a joint venture has been shown with respect to the conduct under that count between two or more individuals. In other words, hearsay is not automatically admissible.

Just as with the conspiracy count itself, hearsay is admissible under a substantive count when and only when a fair preponderance of non-hearsay evidence under the substantive count has been shown. And for that proposition we would rely on United States v. Geaney and United States v. Fantuzzi. Copies of both are in the courtroom for the Court's perusal.

MR. LOPEZ: 463 Fed. 2d, your Honor, and that would be at page 683.

THE COURT: What is the Geaney cite?

MR. LOPEZ: 417, your Honor, Fed. 2d at page 1116.

MRS. ROSNER: The point is this, your Honor:

The jury is very obviously grappling with the question on which substantive counts may hearsay be considered or with respect to any given substantive count what of all the hearsay in the case may be considered, and I don't think even the government would venture to state that hearsay unrelated to a certain count which is admissible by virtue of the conspiracy count comes in as

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evidence under a particular substantive count. There obviously are questions of admissibility with respect to specific substantive counts, and I think your Honor could fairly charge the jury that with regard to a particular substantive count there must be a preponderance of non-hearsay evidence before they may consider the hearsay which might be probative under any given substantive count.

If your Honor will give defense counsel a few moments, we would submit to the Court a proposed instruction along those lines.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, first, I would like to remind the Court that the Court did not charge under the rational of Nuccio, but, rather, instructed the jury in the connected version of your Honor's charge that the jury must first find by a defendant's own acts and declarations joining. I think that is critical.

If we were to change that now, your Honor, I think we would have a veritable boundoggle in there and it would be incomprehensible. Conspiracy is difficult enough to understand.

Secondly, your Honor, hearsay is generally inadmissible. It is admissible, however, as an exception

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under a conspiracy count.

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The cases on which the government primarily relies all discuss conspiracy counts.

Therefore, if your Honor please, hearsay with regard to a substantive count is not admissible, except upon the finding of another exception, to-wit, in this case, the government argues, joint venture.

If your Honor please, joint venture and conspiracy are not terribly far apart when we grapple with the question whether or not hearsay is admissible with regard to a substantive count. We rely on United States v. Annunziata, the citation to be supplied by Mr. Lopez --

MR. LOPEZ: That is 293 Fed. 2d, your Honor, page 373.

MR. FISHER: At headnote 5 of that opinion, your Honor, right at the beginning of headnote 5, the Court takes pains to point out that there must be something besides the hearsay to persuade the trier of facts, at least, that the joint venture, in fact, exists.

The joint venture and conspiracy are not coextensive. Joint venture, in fact, is far more limited. When we are talking about an exception to the hearsay rule under the joint venture rational, we must limit ourselves to the question with respect to a specific count in the

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indictment, was there a joint venture between the declarant and the defendant against whom it is sought to be admitted. And that must be found, I submit, under the rational of Geaney, if your Honor please, by a fair preponderance by your Honor on the basis of non-hearsay testimony.

For example, count 21, so far as I know, is completely devoid of any non-hearsay testimony. The reason I mention that as an example is this:

Therefore, your Honor, I submit, improper for this Court with regard to Count 21, for instance, to advise the jury that hearsay may be considered on that count. It would be improper for the Court, I submit, most respectfully, to advise the jury that if they find a joint venture between the declarant and the defendant Di Napoli on Count 21 they may consider the hearsay because as a matter of law if your Honorplease, there is no sufficient evidence by which this Court can find by a fair preponderance or by any standard that there was, in fact, a joint venture between the declarant and the defendant Di Napoli.

Following that reasoning, your Monor, I think we have to go down count by count to determine whether or not with regard to each count there is sufficient non-hearsay proof in order for the government to meet its

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burden by a fairpreponderance of establishing a joint venture. If that is the case, then the government would argue the hearsay would be admissible.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, joining co-counsel,

I would like to alert the Court to the fact that when the
government was asked to supply its pages of proof in the
record of this court to substantiate specifically Count 21
against Joseph Di Napoli, I submit that it was their
suggestion at all times that page 2174 to page 2177 were
applicable to the count exclusively.

Now I say this to your Honor:

Throughout these three pages that we read to the jury, there is nothing but hearsay evidence. here was no non-hearsay evidence in any of these three pages.

I, therefore, feel, your Honor, unless, as Mr
Fisher has pointed out and Mrs. Rosner has pointed out,
that unless the government can show a joint venture, a joint
venture in this matter, that the jury should be instructed
on the meaning of hearsay and that they cannot apply it,
they cannot apply it to the evidence in this case unless
they find from the testimony that was read to them, 2174
to 2177, that they can find a joint venture.

THE COURT: Just hold it.

Does anybody else from the defense want to say

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anything about this?


MR. SUNDEN: I wish to say this, Judge:

My client is not charged with a substantive count, so this discussion does not directly pertain to him, but just to be clear on the record, Mr. Curran's final comments about no exceptions to the hearsay statements, I would join in co-counsel as to that. I at all times understood your Honor gave us a standing objection and to that extent it does concern my client.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, Mr. Lopez and Mrs. Rosner are asking the Court to do precisely what the Second Circuit has said in both Nuccio and Ragland was not the jury's function to do, and that it is the Court's function to find whether there is a sufficient preponderance of the evidence, which is the standard set forth in Geaney, as to whether or not the hearsay evidence should be admitted, and once the Court makes that determination and finds that there is a sufficient preponderance of evidence, then all the evidence, the hearsay goes in and it can be considered by the jury in its determination of guilt or innocence.

With respect to the lack of objection, I would submit, your Honor, that the question is that there was objection as to whether or not the hearsay evidence should



Honor?

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be admitted on the conspiracy charge and the only count in the entire indictment where the issue arises as to the hearsay evidence vis-a-vis the substantive charge is Count 21, because as to every other count in the indictment there was direct evidence as to that particular transaction.

Count 21 is the only count where the transaction involved purely hearsay evidence. And on that particular point, when that evidence came in, which was Harry Pannirello's testimony as to what Pat Dilacio told him, there was no objection whatsoever by Mr. Lopez or any other counsel as to the admissibility of that evidence on the substantive charge, only with respect to the conspiracy charge.

Finally, your Honor, I would just like to refer the Court to the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Alsondo at 486 Fed. 2d, page 1339, specifically Judge Feinberg's opinion on petition for rehearing at page 1346, where it discusses the question of substantive violations.

THE COURT: All right. Go to lunch.

MR. FISHER: Can we have a little longer, your

THE COURT: About 10 after.

(Luncheon recess.)

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(At 2.50 p.m., in open court, in the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: We have received another note from the jury.

Mr. Clerk, will you mark this as Court's Exhibit 93.

(Court Exhibit 93 marked for identification.)

THE COURT: This one reads:

"Judge Duffy:

"Please read to us the testimony of Harry
Pannirello regarding the drug transaction with a
William Alonzo.

"Very truly yours,

"Lucy Hare Forelady."

MR. SUNDEN: Judge, may I have a few moments to --

THE COURT: You are going to have more than a few moments. Relax. We still haven't cleaned up the hearsay matter. We had two left over from last night, so I think you will have a few minutes.

. MR. SUNDEN: Very good.

THE COURT: All right, bring in the jury.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, just before you left for lunch I received a note which says, "Judge

Duffy:

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"Please explain your charge to us regarding hearsay evidence, only hearsay evidence."

Hearsay has been defined as a statement other than one made by the witness while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Another definition of hearsay might be that hearsay is a statement which was made outside of the presence of the individual against whom it is being offered. The hearsay statement is one which was made out of court and not under oath by a third party who is not a witness before the Court.

Your note did not indicate exactly what you wanted to know about hearsay, but you will remember that I told you during my charge on the conspiracy count you had to consider each defendant separately, that his participation in the conspiracy, if you find one did exist, must be established by the independent evidence of each defendant's own acts, statements and conduct and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

To find that a particular defendant was a member, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that are of its purposes that particular defendant was a willing

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participant with the intent to advance its purposes.

If you do so find, then however limited his role in the furthering of the objectives of the conspiracy, he is responsible for all that was done in furtherance thereof either before or during its continuance.

Once you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant was a member, then the acts and declarations of any other person you also find was a member of the conspiracy made by such co-conspirators during its existence and in furtherance of its objectives are considered the acts and declarations of all other members of the conspiracy even though they were not present.

As to the substantive counts, the rule is somewhat similar.

If you find that two or more defendants named in a particular count or engaged in a joint undertaking but the purpose of the intent of the two defendants being the same and if you find that one defendant was a participant in the joint undertaking, then the acts and declarations of any other person whom you find was also a member of the joint undertaking made in furtherance of the objective of the joint undertaking are considered to be acts and declarations of the other members of that joint

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undertaking even though they were not present.

That concludes my charge to you on hearsay, as I think it covers the matter.

I received, however, another note from you requesting that certain testimony be read.

You may recall that last night I also received two other notes and I did not have that testimony read back to you.

I would appreciate it if you would retire to the juryroom now, send me note telling me what you want read back and in what order. Last night was Count 14 and Count 28, to the best of my recollection, and you didn't want them read at the same time.

This regards the testimony of Pannirello regarding a drug transaction with William Alonzo.

If you would be good enough to let me know which order you want the three things read in and then advise the marshal when you want them read, you just slip a note to them and say, "We want so-and-so read," it will be done.

All right, Mr. Marshal.

(At 3.00 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

THE COURT: Mr. Sunden, I think it would be:

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easiest if you come into the robing room and maybe we can work out what testimony is to be read on William Alonzo.

MR. SUNDEN: Very good. I wonder if I can have a few moments to consult the transcript for maybe five minutes or so?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, did you take care of that evidentiary matter with reference to Tolopka?

THE COURT: No. That is one of the things that is still outstanding. They have been hitting me with so many notes I haven't had a chance to do that. That is one of the things.

Yes, Mrs. Rosner?

MRS. ROSNER: Your Honor, with respect to the charge on hearsay, your Honor, in essence, instructed the jury with respect to substantive count if they found a joint venture, the acts and declarations of each joint venturer were admissible against the others, but you failed to instruct them that they had to find a joint venture by non-hearsay evidence, the result being that they may, under your Honor's instruction, use hearsay to prove the very agency which makes the hearsay admissible.

I am almost certain that is the way that the charge was given. If my recollection is not correct,

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I ask that that charge be read back, because I think it is critical because I think that is the point of the jury note and I think your Honor's instruction as given provides that they can find joint venture by hearsay evidence alone.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Fisher.

MR. FISHER: I think your Honor also incorrectly failed to advise the jury that a declaration made and sought to be admitted against the defendant under a joint venture theory must be found to have been made during the period of the joint venture and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, all defense counsel -THE COURT: Everybody takes an exception, I
assume?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes.

Just to make one inquiry, is it a fact that the objections that counsel generally made at the inception of the trial and during the early stages of the trial accrue to all the hearsay testimony that was later adduced by the government, including that of Count 21? We were covered on those objections that were made? We didn't want to be repetitive.

THE COURT: Mr. Lopez, you recall at the outset of this trial exactly what happened?

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MR. LOPEZ: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I made it absolutely clear. I asked you not to have the entire phalanx of attorneys jumping up.

MR. LOPEZ: Right. Thank you very much, Judge Duffy.

THE COURT: Did you object to being included in the phalanx?

MR. ELLIS: No, I am starting a newphalanx.

Your Honor, we have had a series of guestions going to the admissibility of evidence, and I suggest that it might be appropriate at this time or at the next convenient time to remind the jury that even when evidence is admissible, the weight of that evidence belongs to them, and they ought to consider everything bearing on credibility, and when we say something is admissible we don't mean that that piece of evidence that is introduced is established by any means.

THE COURT: All right. Let me think about that. Mr. Sunden, do you figure it will take you five or ten minutes?

MR. SUNDEN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right, fine. Let me know when you are ready.

Mr. Curran --

MR. CURRAN: We are ready.

THE COURT: I thought you would be. It is 2190

through 93 of the direct?

MR. CURRAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

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(At 3.15 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

(In the robing room.)

THE COURT: There was a discussion yesterday as to how much of the Barnaba direct was to go in. Everybody agreed, I think, it started on 1422, line 1. There is a question as to whether it should break at 1425 or 1427, line 6.

MR. CURRAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I believe it proper that 1427, line 6, go in.

MR. ELLIS: Judge, I take it I have an exception?

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.

(At 3.35 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

(In open court, in the absence of the jury.,

THECOURT: I received two notes from the jury.

One reads:

"Judge Duffy:

"Please send us testimony regarding Count 14 and Count 28.

"Thank you."

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That is going to be marked as Court's Exhibit 94 for identification.

The second note reads:

"Judge, we are now," underlined "now,"

"ready to hear the testimony regarding Count 14."

I have ruled on the testimony that is to come in in the robing room.

Mr. Clerk, bring in the jury and we will have it read to them.

MRS. ROSNER: Your Honor, that is the 1422 sequence?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Court Exhibit 94 and 95, respectively, marked for identification.)

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you asked for the testimony concerning Count 14 to be read to you. The court reporter is going to do that now.

> (Page 1422, line 1, to page 1427, line 6, read to the jury.)

(Page 1681, lines 1 to 15, read to the jury.)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Marshal and ladies and gentlemen, you may leave.

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(At 3.45 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

(At 3.50 p.m., a note was received from the
jury.)

THE COURT: Mr. Curran, you said you had an exhibit on Mr. Tolopka. I can't find it.

MR. CURRAN: Yes, your Honor. I believe there are two. One is Government's Exhibit 103 in evidence, which consists of the Yonkers Raceway employees' work record documents introduced through Mr. Malerba, who was a defense witness. I hand that up to your Honor.

The other consists of -- these are defendant exhibits, but I was using them on cross and I had them, your Honor. It is Defendant's Exhibit I, it is two memo books, and my recollection is -- I think Mr. Richman would agree -- they were only admitted as to the months of August and October of 1970, and there are entries for various days and gaps for other days.

THE COURT: Do you want to break them up?

MR. RICHMAN: I have no objection, unless you want to put the whole thing in for whatever purpose it is worth.

MR. CURRAN: I think it should just go in for those months, your Honor.

MR. RICHMAN: Why don't we put a rubber band around the other part and indicate that --

THE COURT: I don't care. You can work it out among yourselves.

MR. CURRAN: Mr. Richman and I, I am sure, if we can get together for a few minutes, can submit them to you with agreement.

THE COURT: All right. I know Mr. Sunden stepped out. He apparently lost his briefcase. He wanted to run down -- here he is.

MR. ELLIS: I think I can get Rosner and Fisher.
THE COURT: All right.

I would like to turn these exhibits over as fast as possible since they did request them.

I will tell you what I will do, I will just mention to the jury when they come out that I am going to give them to the marshal and he will deliver them through the door to them.

MR. RICHMAN: Very well.

MR. CURRAN: By that time we will be ready.

THE COURT: All right.

All right, bring back the jury.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, before the jury returns,
I'm not sure that all the lawyers are here or covered if

1 tpl3 2 they are not here. 3 MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I am covering for Mr. 4 King and Mr. Pollak. 5 THE COURT: All right. Is Mr. King's client 6 here? 7 DEFENDANT GAMBA: Yes. 8 THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Gamba? 9 DEFENDANT GAMBA: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Salley, do you agree? 11 DEFENDANT SALLEY: Yes, Judge, I do. 12 MRS. ROSNER: Your Honor, may I know what the 13 jury is going to be read now? 14 THE COURT: Yes. This is the testimony on 15 Count 28 which was agreed to in the robing room last night. 16 MRS. ROSNER: That is what I wanted to know, 17 Judge. 18 THE COURT: All right. It is pages 399, line 19 18, to 402, line 8, and 696, line 5, to 697, line 21. 20 MRS. ROSNER: Thank you, Judge. 21 (Jury present.) 22 MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, may we just approach 23 the side bar briefly? 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 (At the side bar.)

bail."

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THE COURT: Did I miss something?

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MR. PHILLIPS: I think line 18 reads, "Did Lentini mention after you got out on bail," and obviously

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the meaning is, "Did Moe Lentini mention when he got out on

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THE COURT: Do you agree?

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MRS. ROSNER: Yes, I do agree.

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THE COURT: All right. What page is that?

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MR. PHILLIPS: That is on page 399, line 18,

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the first line.

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(In open court.)

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THE COURT: I received a note which is going to

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be Court's Exhibit 96, which reads: "We are now ready for

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testimony regarding Count 28."

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All right, Mr. Reporter, would you read that,

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please.

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(Page 399, line 18, to page 402, line 8, was

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read to the jury.)

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(Page 696, line 5, to page 697, line 21, was read to the jury.)

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THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, the last evening you also requested to see the various

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exhibits, including the tax returns and so on for the defendant Tolopka. I am going to have the marshal deliver

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those through the door to you.

please.

(At 4.05 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

All right, Mr. Marshal, take the jury out,

THE COURT: I have another note.

"We would like to hear the summation remarks of, Λ , the defense attorney and, B, the prosecuting attorney regarding Count 21."

After you figure it out, come into the robing room.

(Court Exhibit 97 marked for identification.)

(At 4.15 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

(In the robing room.)

MR. SENDEN: Briefly stated, Judge, my position as to these suggested lines, 2456, line 22, through 2458, line 14, is this:

While certainly I guess I agree I would abide by your Honor's ruling as to general credibility such as the fact that a man might have charge pending against him and I guess that would be something that should not necessarily be rehashed, these questions are preliminary

to my questions which later on ask, "Didn't you, in fact, say that there was a dry spell from February to March, '72?"

If that is believed by the jury, that is not a general reason to disbelieve this man, that is a direct conflict with his direct testimony wherein he stated he made a sale to Alonzo during February or March of 1972.

These questions here, in my cross-examination I didn't proceed by saying, "Isn't it true there was a dry spell and didn't you swear to tell the truth to the agent," I proceeded in my cross-examination by first askir him, "Didn't you swear what you said to the agent was true, and later on I said, "Didn't you say there was a dry spell in February to May?"

Part of my whole defense here is that this man made a prior inconsistent statement and in that statement he swore he was telling the truth at the time. To not allo this to come in in cross-examination is really to take away the heart of my defense here.

This is not just general credibility because the man has indictments hanging out against him, this is a prior inconsistent statement, the very heart of my defense, particularly in light of your Honor's marshalling of the facts wherein as to my client you stated that the

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This is not just general credibility because the man has indictments hanging out against him, this is a prior inconsistent statement, the very heart of my defense, particularly in light of your Honor's marshalling of the facts wherein as to my client you stated that the

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defendants are relying upon the general prior inconsistencie of witnesses and then you did not proceed to -- in marshalling the facts you told Pannirello's allegation that he made this transaction with Alonzo, but you did not allude to the fact that Pannirello did come, indeed, make a prior inconsistent statement to a government agent wherein he told the truth.

I would submit if your Honor didn't allow this in, really, the heart of my defense would be out. This is not a general credibility question, this is a preliminary question to a direct conflict of testimony here. He couldn't have been telling the truth both times.

MR. PHILLIFA: Your Honor, I think, correctly decided when the jury asked a question of Count 21 with respect to Di Napoli that general credibility gone into on cross-examination by Mr. Lopez would not be read to them and I think the same applies here. This goes to general credibility.

MR. SUNDEN: I really don't think it is general credibility, your Honor, I think it is as to the specific date involved.

THE COURT: I will hold up on this one. I don't see a specific date here.

MR. SUNDEN: Judge, what I --

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THE COURT: You are not losing yet. Let us go on to the specific date.

Where is that?

MR. SUNDEN: Do you want me to direct your attention now to the part where he does mention the date, the actual date?

MR. SUNDEN: In these series of questions I

didn't get to the date part yet, this was explaining what the dry spell was --

THE COURT: The whole guts of it starts at 2460, not before that, "During the course of these interviews."

MR. SUNDEN: That is true, except that I would submit if the jury started at 2460 they might not know what interviews I am reterring to. The other questions are preliminary, so that the jury would understand that what interviews I am talking about are the interviews with the government agent, wherein he swore he was going to tell the truth. I think they would be coming in cold and they might not know what interviews I am talking about. That is the reason I asked for those.

I want to just change part of that request I made here starting at 2465 and delete on 2466, lines 8

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through 15.

MR. PHILLIPS: I don't see what this has to do at all with the jury's note and request.

Here we are talking about Butch Pugliese going to jail and telephone numbers he gave and so forth.

MR. SUNDEN: My position on this would be Panirello's testimony was that Alonzo was a customer and this goes to disabuse that notion.

THE COURT: It is my understanding that Alonzo was starting out again.

I wouldn't let the government get into the fact, and I don't even think they tried, but I wouldn't let them get into the fact that he was just getting out of jail at that time, but I learned it from some place.

MR. SUNDEN: Right.

I can see that this part of the testimony might fall into more of a general credibility attack rather than a specific inconsistent statement.

THE COURT: Under the circumstances, I am not going to let that in.

What is the next one?

MR. SUNDEN: The part where we disagree -THE COURT: Let me see what is involved here.

(Pause.)

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2472.

MR. PHILLIPS: The government consents to line 9 to line 14 on page 2472, that one question and that one answer.

MR. SUNDEN: Can I be heard as to that?

THE COURT: I will let in up to line 14 on page

I don't know what it means.

MR. SUNDEN: It refers to the statement he gave the agents seven or eight months ago.

MR. PHILLIPS: Are you talking about 2475?

MR. SUNDEN: Yes.

MR. PHILLIPS: I think this just talks generally.

MR. SUNDEN: No. The whole cross-examination is based on the fact he gave a prior inconsistent statement to the agent.

THE COURT: The request on 2475 is denied.

MR. PHILLIPS: I take it your Honor has granted to a certain extent the defendant's request regarding the prior statement on the dry spell?

THE COURT: Yes.

M.. PHILLIPS: If your Honor does, the government would then ask that page 2577, lines 2 through 15, be read. That is redirect examination.

MR. SUNDEN: Can I just look at that? I don't

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have that.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: To where?

MR. PHILLIPS: Line 19, your Honor, where the witness says, "Yes."

MR. SUNDEN: Judge, may I just say, if you were inquiring to grant that for the government, I would ask you to reconsider the request I made at 2475, then, because just as the government's redirect here is an attempt to clarify that, so that question on cross-examination is directly on that point, also. I don't think one should be allowed in without the other.

MR. PHILLIPS: This is directed only to clarify the cross-examination that you went into regarding the prior inconsistent statement on the dry spell.

MR. SUNDEN: That is what I am saying, that question that your Honor just indicated --

THE COURT: What is that?

MR. SUNDEN: 2475 to 2476, line 23.

That question relates to the very same topic that the redirect is trying to clear up.

THE COURT: You mean the one question and one answer?

MR. SUNDEN: Yes.

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(Pause.)

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MR. SUNDEN: Judge, on 2959, I would ask that you would include starting at line 10, because I don't think the question makes sense without that previous question if you just start with line 14 where it says, "What is that?"

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THE COURT: All right.

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The first three pages of Section 2456 through 2458 will not be read.

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MR. SUNDEN: I respectfully take exception to that, Judge.

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(In open court, in the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Yes, of course. You don't have to.

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THE COURT: The note that came in first reads:

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"Judge Duffy:

testimony on William Alonzo."

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"We are now," underlined, "ready to hear the

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That will be marked as a Court's exhibit.

THE COURT: I have another note. I will take

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(Court Exhibit 97 marked for

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identification.)

I will read it to you.

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care of this one now, but we have to think about this next

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note, because I don't know what the answer to it is, but

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"We would like to know the following dates:

"1. Of the original indictment.

Of the supplementary indictment."

I think they mean the superseding indictment.

"3. When Mr. Barnaba went to Mr. Tolopka's house wired with the tape recorder."

I don't remember that date ever coming in.

MR. RICHMAN: It was May of 1973, your Honor.

MR. DOWD: It came out as May of 1973, Judge.

THE COURT: "4. The specific date when Mr.

Tolopka was indicted."

Mark this as a Court's exhibit.

(Court's Exhibit 98 marked for identification.)

THE COURT: I think I might have in this record more notes marked as Court's exhibits than I did of newspaper articles marked as exhibits.

MR. ELLIS: Judge, am I correct there were three indictments, one back in April, October --

THE COURT: That is what I want to talk about after I get this testimony read to them, because they sound like they are chomping at the bit. They don't realize how long it takes to cull out this testimony.

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MR. PANZER: Your Honor, I had made certain objections with respect to this testimony with respect to Hattie Ware. I don't think we have rulings on that.

THE COURT: Hold on for a second. Do you recall what page that was on?

MR. PHILLIPS: 2193, I think.

MR. PANZER: Just up to there, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. I assume you are withdrawing your objection?

MR. PANZER: Yes.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I am covering for Mr. Pollak.

THE COURT: All right.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: First of all, ladies and gentlemen, let me apologize. I received your note stating that you were now ready to hear the testimony on William Alonzo, which is Court's Exhibit 97. I got that some minutes ago, but the logistics of culling out of the rec rd what would be relevant and what would answer your question are pretty difficult, so don't think I have been goofing off, it is just that I have to get it lined up.

Mr. Reporter, would you be good enough to read the indicated portions of the testimony.

(Page 2190, line 14, to page 2193, line 4;
page 2459, line 10, to page 2460, line 23; page
2464, line 6, to page 2465, line 12; page 2467,
line 12, to page 2472, line 14; page 2475, line 23,
to page 2476, line 3; and page 2571, line 1, to page
2577, line 19, were read to the jury.)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen.

I realize I am minning behind you with the notes, but I am doing the best I can.

All right, Mr. Marsha.

(At 5.00 o'clock p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

THE COURT: All right. Let us see if we can get answers to 98 for identification.

The original indictment, does anyone know the date offhand?

MR. PHILLIPS: If we are talking about the April indictment, that was April 13, 1973.

The next indictment superseded that.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PHILLIPS: That was October 3, 1973.

The final indictment was December 6, 1973.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, I am not really concerned with the April indictment as it did not concern -- withdrawn.

THE COURT: The last, the December 6, 1973, was the indictment in which it named the defendant Tolopka, is that correct?

MR. PHILLIPS: Yes.

MR. RICHMAN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Barnaba went to Tolopka's house somebody told me in May of 1973.

MR. RICHMAN: May of '73 wired up.

THE COURT: All right. Would anybody be good enough to walk inside while working on the other note and just tell me the page?

MR. CURRAN: Page 1621, your Honor.

(At 5.55 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

THE COURT: Mr. Clerk, will you mark this note. (Court Exhibit 99 marked for

identification.)

.THE COURT: I heard someone say while the clerk was marking the exhibit, "What time is dinner?"

I have arranged for the jury to go to Stark's, which is on Broadway. That is off limits to everybody

tp27 2 tonight. They will be going there at 6.30. 3 I received a note which was marked Court's Exhibit 99 for identification which says: 5 "Please tell us on what dates the following men 6 were arrested: 7 "Harry Pannirello, Jimmy Pannirello." 8 I believe that means John Pannirello. There is 9 no Jimmy Pannirello in this case, to the best of my know-10 ledge. 11 MR. POLLAK: Jim Provitera. 12 THE COURT: He is next. 13 "Jimmy Provitera and John Barnaba." 14 I think that those items are in the record. 15 MR. FISHER: Yes. 16 MR.LOPEZ: Yes. 17 MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, Barnaba is November 14, 18 1972. 19 THE COURT: Do you have the page citation, Mr. 20 Richman? 21 MR. DOWD: Your Honor, it is somewhere in his 22 cross-examination where reference was made to the date of 23 the tape in Rogers' office, which is dated November 14th, 24 I believe. 25 THE COURT: Does anyone have any objection to me

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telling the jury the four dates if I can find the four dates in the record?

MR. LOPEZ: No, not at all.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CURRAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: We received another note before this about asking for the date of the original indictment, then the supplementary indictment, which I believe is the superseding indictment, then the date that Barnaba went to Tolopka's house wired up and what date Tolopka was indicted.

I think perhaps the people might like to be heard on this. Mr. Curran, would you --

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, with respect to all the questions, we have no objection to the dates of all three indictments being told to the jury, and I think we have agreed that May, 1973, is the response to the other question asked by the jury. The specific date of Tolopka's indictment, as I understand it, is December 6, 1973, or the date of the third of the three indictments.

If your Honor decides to give that information to the jury, we have no objection, we are entirely in your Honor's hands.

However, if your Honor is giving the information,

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we would ask your Honor to instruct the jury that just as in the case of the indictments themselves, the dates of the indictments are not evidence.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, I believe the jury asked only for the dates.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. RICHMAN: They are in evidence. I think they should be given as is, without any instructions limiting them in any fashion.

THE COURT: Wait a second. They are not in evidence and unless the government consents to it, Mr. Richman, I will tell them only the date of the second superseding indictment, but they have consented. That is the only indictment that they are concerned with. Nothing else, nothing else is in the record.

MR. RICHMAN: I beg to differ with your Honor.

THE COURT: The government has indicated they are willing to give the dates. Don't fight it.

MR. RICHMAN: Okay.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, if the dates of the indictments are not in evidence -- I had assumed that they were, but if the dates of the indictments are not in evidence, it is the government's position they should not

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be given to the jury.

THE COURT: You just said they should be.

MR. CURRAN: I said I had no objection to it, your Honor, I said I was entirely in your Honor's hands on that point. I was assuming, based upon what has been said, that the dates appear in the record before the jury.

THE COURT: I don't know if they do or they don't. I am at a total loss.

How many pages are in this record at this point?

MR. CURRAN: Over 5000, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Could you gentlemen work out a stipulation as to the four dates of Harry Pannirello, I believe it should be John Pannirello and not Jimmy, Jimmy Provitera and John Barnaba?

To the best of my recollection, it is November, 1972, for Barnaba and February 3, 1973, for all the others, although I think there was a break of two days there, February 3rd and February 4th.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, I believe --

MR. PANZER: February 2nd.

MR. CURRAN: I believe Provitera was arrested on the evening of February 3, 1973, and that the two Pannirellos were arrested on February 4, 1973.

I think we are already in agreement that John

3 These dates, your Honor, I am quite certain are in the record. THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. LOPEZ: Were are in agreement as far as those dates go. THE COURT: All right. (Pause.) 10 5 THE COURT: Mark this note as the next Court's 11 exhibit. 12 XX (Court Exhibit 100 marked for 13 identification.) 14 THE COURT: Court's Exhibit No. 100 reads: 15 "To Judge Duffy: 5.50 P.M. 16 "We are ready for the summations requested 17 re Count 21. 18 "Lucy Hare, Forelady." 19 I am going to have them out. I am going to give 20 them the dates of the arrests of the four witnesses. I am 21 also going to give them the dates of the original indict-22 ment, superseding indictment, and so on, and explain to 23 them that the dates of the indictments and superseding 24 indictment are merely the dates when accusations were made 25 and not evidence in this case.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. CO 7-4580

Barnaba was arrested on November 14, 1972.

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All right, bring back the jury.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you asked me for the dates, "Please tell me on what dates the following men were arrested:

"Harry Pannirello."

Harry Pannirello was arrested was February 4, 1973.

You then list Jimmy Pannirello, and I think you mean John Pannirello. John Pannirello was arrested February 4, 1973.

Jimmy Provitera was arrested on February 3, 1973.

John Barnaba was arrested on November 14, 1972.

You asked for the dates of the indictments.

I am going to tell you now that the dates of the indictment --

THE FORELADY: Did you say Barnaba was '72 or 73, your Honor?

THE COURT: That was November 14, 1972.

THE FORELADY: Thank you.

THE COURT: As for the dates of the indictments, those dates of the indictments and the superseding indict-

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ment are merely the dates when accusations were made. Just like the indictments, they are not evidence.

The original indictment was filed April 13, 1973, the first superseding indictment was filed October 3, 1973, the second superseding indictment was filed December 6, 1973.

You asked which indictment the defendant Tolopka was named in and it was the last one, December 6, 1973.

You asked when Mr. Barnaba went to Tolopka's house when he was wired up. That date is in or about May, 1973. There is no exact date.

All right. You indicated that you would like sections of the summations read in connection with Count 21. The logistics of this are extremely difficult and please be patient with me. I am not quite clear yet as to where we are going to come on that one.

As perhaps you know, or maybe you don't know, we have made arrangements for you to go to dinner over at Stark's Restaurant. I think you have been there before. All right.

(At 6.10 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

THE COURT: Mr. Lopez and Mr. Curran, would you come inside with me, please.

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(At 8.35 p.m., in open court, in the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: I received a request before to read the summation of counsel on Count 21. I have gone through the summations of those suggested to me as to Count 21. There is less than one page involved in the count directly and that comes from you, Mr. Lopez. Mr. Curran's summation did not go through the evidence count by count.

Under the circumstances, I feel that
I am going to refuse the jury's request to read the summation. I wanted to write out exactly what I was going to
say so that you will know before I say it.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have gone through the various summations looking for argument of counsel on Count 21 which you asked for.

There is only one summation which touches on this question, and there for less than one full page. Needless to say, it gives only one point of view.

Under the circumstances, I feel it unfair for any summations on this count to be read to you, and I must, therefore, refuse your request.

MR. LOPEZ: May I be heard, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR.LOPEZ: Your Honor, I would except to your

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Honor's ruling in this matter and I would respectfully

request that your Honor leave it up to the jury whether or not they would like to hear one summation.

Certainly they have asked for both. I feel that the government has not been precluded from arguing on this point if they wanted to. I understand what their problem was. Nevertheless, I also understand that of Di Napoli. And I feel that the option of hearing one summation, if that is what they want, should be left to them and I would ask that the message be phrased in those terms.

This is in view of the fact that yesterday, your Honor, we took the position with the jury --

THE COURT: Yes, I understand. I am aware of what happened yesterday.

No, under the circumstances I am going to deny it.

All right, Mr. Clerk, bring back the jury.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, Mr. Fisher wishes to address the Court for one moment.

(Pause.)

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, the suggestion has been made to me, your Honor, and I think it has been well taken, if your Honor would indicate that one summation dealt with

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the point rather than delineating it as one page. If that could be eradicated from the message --

THE COURT: As I said, there is only one summation which touches on this question.

MR. LOPEZ: And my request is that we eliminate the fact that that summation involves one page. I think there is reference in the Court's --

THE COURT: And there for less than one full page.

MR. LOPEZ: "And there for less than one full page" I would ask, your Honor, that at least that be deleted.

We are not saying which summation dealt with the problem.

Do you want me to rewrite the note?

THE COURT: No, I am going to bring them out and read it to them.

All right.

MR. PANZER: Your Honor, I may be anticipating a problem, but I think we ought to consider it.

I wouldn't want the jury to take this particular note and feel that they couldn't ask for any of the summations if that were the case and I think --

THE COURT: I don't think it gives that impres-

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sion at all. I am not sending a note to them, I am going to read it to them. I don't think it conveys that impression at all.

MR. PANZER: All right.

THE COURT: I will tell youwhat, Mr. Panzer, suppose I add this, "If there is anything else you wish, however, I will be glad to consider your request and furnish it to you."

MR. PANZER: I would ask if your Honor says if there are any other summations pertaining to any other areas you wish to hear, I will consider it.

THE COURT: No. I am going to stick to if there is anything else you want, which is guite clear.

MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, do we have any other open notes from the jury?

THE COURT: No.

MR. RICHMAN: That is it?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POLLAK: What about the Forbrick note?

THE COURT: Give them a chance, Mr. Richman.

They have only been back for five minutes.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have gone through the various summations looking for the argument

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of counsel on Count 21 which you have asked for.

There is only one summation which touches on the point. Needless to say, it gives only one point of view.

Under the circumstances, I feel that it is unfair for any summations on this count to be read to you and, therefore, I must refuse your request.

If there is any other matterwhich you want, however, I will be glad to consider it and do my best to comply with the request.

I am sorry I must refuse this one, but I feel I must.

All right.

THE FORELADY: Thank you.

(At 8.40 p.m., the jury returned to the juryroom to continue to deliberate upon a verdict.)

THE COURT: All right. Please don't wander too far away. I don't know what is going to happen. I gave up on prophesizing what juries would do when I discovered I just didn't have the talent.

(At 9.20 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

THE COURT: We are now up to Exhibit 101.

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(Court Exhibit 101 was marked for identification.)

THE COURT: "Dear Judge Duffy:

"Can we consider testimony regarding conspiracy as corroborative evidence on a substantive charge? Rather than calling us into court, we would appreciate it if you could answer us in writing."

MR. DOWD: Would you repeat it, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes.

"Can we consider testimony regarding conspiracy as corroborative evidence on a substantive Rather than calling us into court, charge? we would appreciate it if you could answer us in writing."

MR. ELLIS: Judge, I think that requires repeating the entire charge.

MRS. ROSNER: May we have a few minutes to draft a reply?

THE COURT: Yes. I would suggest that a complete answer might take a couple of years, but if you want to take -- do you want to be heard?

MR. CURRAN: Yes, your Honor. I think the answer is a very simple one. I think the answer is yes.

1 tp40 2 THE COURT: I am willing to give the defense 3 counsel a couple of minutes to see what they can do. MR. CURRAN: That is the government's 5 position. 6 THE COURT: We understand that. I am going to give you -- you said a couple of 8 minutes? How about fifteen? 9 MR. ROSENBERG: Judge, if his answer is yes, 10 our's is no. We don't need a couple of minutes. 11 THE COURT: Think about it. 12 MR. DOWD: Can we have the note, Judge? I don't 13 understand it yet. 14 THE COURT: Do you want to make notes on it? 15 I will read it to you again. 16 MR. DOWD: Once more. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, was that signed by the 19 Forelady? 20 THE COURT: No. 21 MR. POLLAK: Who is it by? 22 . THE COURT: "Dear Judge Duffy: 23 "Can we consider testimony regarding con-24 spiracy on corroborative evidence on a substantive 25

charge?"

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MR. PHILLIPS: Do they say "or" or "as"?

THE COURT: As corroborative evidence. .

"Rather than calling us into court, we would appreciate it if you could answer us in writing."

Do you want to know who signed it?

MR. DOWD: Yes.

THE COURT: "Sincerely, Hazel Hayman." That is Juror No. 7.

Take 15 minutes and I will see what you have.

(At 9.35 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)

(Court Exhibits 102 and 103, respectively, marked for identification.)

THE COURT: 102 for identification reads:

"To Judge Duffy:

"We would like to receive the following:

- "1. The summation remarks of the prosecuting attorney.
- "2. The summation remarks of the defense attorney.
- "3. The summary remarks of the Judge regarding Benjamin Tolopka."

103 for identification:

"We would like to hear the testimony of Barnaba

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about Tolopka and the testimony of Tolopka's witnesses on offense."

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I assume that is defense witnesses.

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MR. DOWD: Your Honor, if I may?

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THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

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MR. DOWD: I was going to make a suggestion.

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Based at least on those last notes I would think

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that in regard to the testimony, it wouldn't be the best

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idea, perhaps, to break it up. It would seem that should

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take quite a long time to read that back, and perhaps that

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would be better left for tomorrow morning.

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THE COURT: I don't know. I have to take a look

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at it. I am going to take a look. I figure you are

of the prosecuting attorney are, and I assume that the

second one, and I am going to have to go look at the

entire summation of Mr. Richman would be the answer to the

summary of the evidence that I did. That is going to be

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entitled to know what the notes are as soon as I do, so I

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just walked out.

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else?

a fairly monumental task.

Mrs. Rosner, you indicated you had something

You might think about what the summation remarks

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MRS. ROSNER: Yes, your Honor.

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"Concerning Exhibit 101, Mrs. Hayman, we have received your note.

"Your question is not susceptible to a simple general answer. It would be helpful if you could phrase your question in terms of the problem you are considering."

We would suggest answering it in that fashion, your Honor, for the following reasons:

The purpose of this kind of communication

between the Court and jury is to be instructive

and helpful to the jurors in their deliberations.

The question is so amorphous, it is so undirected that you really can't be positive what it is they are getting at.

If they have a serious problem, your Honor, I think we ought tohelp them, if possible, to define what information it is they are seeking.

For instance, this afternoon they came in and wasted an hour of their time and ours getting a charge on circumstantial evidence when what the jury was seeking to get was a charge on the meaning of hearsay. So I think rather than waste more time --

THE COURT: That was this morning.

MRS. ROSNER: This morning, right.

Rather than wasting more time in drawing up

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complex answers to various simplequestions which may be the creation of error when none exists, the simplest

solution would be to ask them what they are talking about.

MR. FISHER: I object to the part "where none now exists," your Honor. I am sure upon reflection Mrs. Rosner would like to withdraw that herself.

THE COURT: No, it will stand.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, can I make inquiry of who signed notes 102 and 103?

THE COURT: 103 is unsigned, 102 is signed"Lucy Hare, Forelady."

MR. DOWD: Your Honor, I would just like to be heard, too.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DOWD: I think that any answer which would be in more specific language would be extraordinarily dangerous in a case this large with this many defendants and this much evidence heard, because the thing that I think everyone worries about in a case like this is just that the volume of evidence is so monumental that it can be overwhelming and I think that we all, obviously the defendants in particular, are concerned with that and to answer a question like that as to what would corroborate evidence with respect to the substantive counts is a very,

very complex, sophisticated question and I say it is very, very dangerous in terms of answering any more specifically at this time.

THE COURT: All right. I hear your argument.

I might have an answer for it.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, it seems to the government that it is not for us to pass upon, to paraphrase Mrs. Rosner, what the jury is getting at. The jury has asked a very specific question in Court Exhibit 101 and I really think there is one very specific answer and I didn't mean to be facetious at all. I think the answer is very clearly yes, and I think that is all the answer that is needed.

I don't think you should respond to the jury by asking a jury your question, which has been suggested.

MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Dowd and Mrs. Rosner, it would be exceedingly dangerous to try to answer a hypothetical question when we don't know the count that it relates to and the evidence that they consider corroborative of the evidence adduced in support of that count.

We need some factual framework to answer this question. We just can't answer it out of the air, out of whole cloth. The obvious perils of that, I would say, are too great to not ask that follow-up question, "What

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are you talking about?"

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I would think that the answer in any event could never be "Yes." I think that is because ultimately what corroborates what is a question of fact, not one of law, and that is solely the province of the jury, your Honor.

MR. PANZER: Your Honor, may I just be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PANZER: I think the note reflects a Pinkerton problem where they ask whether the conspiracy corroborates some of the substantive acts. Your Honor did not charge that in its charge and I think we are restricted to that and I think the answer to that note is a plain no. I don't see any other way of getting around it.

THE COURT: No one ever bothers to read the record in the Pinkerton case. The Judge there never charged it, either. I don't know why people believe you have to charge it at all.

All right. Do you want to be heard?

MR. CURRAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

This note doesn't make any sense and what I have to do is go back and read the other notes to see if it does

in the absence of the jury.)

Exhibit 104 for identification.

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. CO 7-4580

THE COURT: We will mark this note Court's

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(Court's Exhibit 104 was marked for

identification.)

THE COURT: Remember, we started off with notes on Court's Exhibit 77.

This one reads:

"Judge Duffy:

"Please cancel any request for testimony and/or information re Joe Di Napoli."

I went back and checked. I thought we gave them everything except the summations. I don't know what it means.

MR. FISHER: The corroboration question.

THE COURT: My problem is --

MR. LOPEZ: Excuse me, your Honor, did they say Joe Di Napoli?

THE COURT: Yes, Joe.

The request for the Barnaba testimony on Tolopka, the Tolopka witnesses and so on and so forth will run, minus summation -- I heard the estimate, first of all, of defense counsel, I heard the estimate of government counsel and now I am going to come out with my estimate since theirs is substantially less than mine. I figure about four hours. It is about a day and a quarter of the defense case by Mr. Richman, there is about 55 minutes of summation by Mr.

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Pichman, there is about 10 to 20 minutes maybe of summation by Mr. Curran and then we are going to go through that thing that took us two hours to read the other day on Tolopka again.

I don't know if you fellows can take the grind of sitting here for another four or four and a half hours.

MR. DOWD: No, Judge.

THE COURT: But I will tell you, I am bone tired and I am not going to do it tonight. I am going to go in and tell the jury that we will take care of their requests tomorrow and we think that they ought to go and have a good night's sleep.

Does anyone object?

MR. DOWD: No, Judge.

MRS.ROSNER: No, your Honor.

MR. LOPEZ: No, your Honor.

MR. POLLAK: The only thing is with respect to the request which the government says should be answered yes, Exhibit 101, I think they should now be asked whether that referred to Mr. Di Napoli.

THE COURT: I will tell you what, let me sleep on it before I do anything about that, because it might refer to somebody else. I don't want to go in and say, "Does this refer to the defendant Joe Di Napoli?"

Just let me sleep on it. All right. Good night, ladies and gentlemen.

MR. DOWD: What time tomorrow morning?

THE COURT: 10 o'clock.

(Adjourned to Tuesday, March 12, 1974,

at 10.00 A.M.)